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It has been a widespread opinion that the development in crude birth and death rates in most 
countries around the World follow the pattern known as the model of “The Demographic 
Transition”, and a comparison of the development in crude birth and death rates will show 
this tendency. However, there are countries that do not follow this pattern.  
 
Normally the birth rate falls when economic development with old age provision, health 
care and low infant mortality occurs. Children are no longer the only possible help and 
security for the parent generation and this affects the number of birth pr. family. 
 
There are countries where the crude birth rates still continue at a high level or even have 
increased, when economic development sets in. This phenomenon is normally explained 
with a fall in number of women who die in childbirth, but for some countries other 
explanations are also needed. 
 
The tendency with a continuing high or increasing birth rate has also been seen in countries 
where Islam is the predominant religion. For some of the countries in this category even 
after they have reached very high productivity measured by GNP pr. capita. This has had 
the effect of a very high population growth in these countries since 1950. 
 
A correlation of crude birth rates and crude death rates for a number of Moslem countries 
(fig. 1) and some European countries shows, that Moslem countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa (the MENA countries) since 1980 in general follow the development for these 
to parameters in non-Moslem countries. The crude death rate is falling, especially because 
of the falling infant mortality rates. The crude birth rate is also falling but in smaller 
numbers than the death rate. The result is now a falling natural growth (F-D). As a result of 
age structure and increasing life expectancy, the number of inhabitants in the different 
countries will still increase for a long period of years.  
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Changes in crude birth and death rates from 1980 to 1998. 
(World Bank Data Sheet. See table 1). 
 
Lines (vectors) showing development from high values (upper right corner) to low values 
(lower left corner).  X-X: Iran. Quadrates: European countries. Circles: MENA-countries. 
Black balls: Asian countries. Triangle: Israel. Long line = Fast change. Short line = Slow 
change. 
 
In the preindustrial start-up phase of the Demographic Transition the European countries 
had F-o/oo values around 30-35 and D-o/oo values around 25-30. This means an extra 
surplus of newborn in the Moslem countries compared with Europe. The Demographic 
Transition in Denmark is shown by a broad grey line with 50 years intervals since 1750. 
The difference in the course of the demographic transition in Europe and in Denmark can be 
demonstrated with these figures: In Denmark at the start of the Demographic Transition 
(DT) in 1780 live about 0.84 million inhabitants. When DT ended about 1930 Denmark had 
3.5 million inhabitants. This means extra 1.7 million people in 150 years. In Iran lived in 
1950 about 16 million people, and in 2003 with TFR below 2.0 there are 68 million people. 
This means extra 52 million people in a period of 50 years. In Denmark the population 
European 
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Afghanistan 
Denmark  
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doubled for every 75 years. In Iran it doubled for every 25 years. The population growth 
when passing the Demographic Transition has in Iran at least had twice “the effect” as in 
Denmark. 
 
The lines in fig. 1 are showing that Moslem countries also follow the path of the 
“demographic transition” although there are some differences. The fertility in the Moslem 
countries in the first phases of the transition is far higher (in the 20th and the twenty-first 
century than the fertility was in Europe in the 18th century. This means that there is a 
considerable larger surplus of people in these countries when passing the demographic 
transition.  
 
Figure 2 
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Crude Birth Rate vs. GNP pr. Capita 1998 in MENA-countries, other 
Islamic countries and European countries. 
(World Bank Data Sheet. See table 1.) 
 
Iran is following the “trend-line”. Saudi Arabia is an “out-lier” having either too high a birth 
rate or too high a productivity/welfare compared to other MENA-countries. 
 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Iran 
AMID Working Paper Series 
 
4 
Figure 3 
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TFR (Total Fertility Rates) vs. GNP pr. Capita 1998 in MENA-countries, 
other Islamic countries and European countries.  
(World Bank Data Sheet. See table 1.) 
 
Iran is also following the “trend line”. but Saudi-Arabia and The United Emirates are “out-
liers” on these parameters.  
 
To reveal the economic situation of the different, countries the crude birth rate can be 
correlated to the economic status (productivity/welfare) of the country measured by the 
GNP pr. capita (fig. 2). This demonstrates that as the economy is growing the birth rates (or 
TFR (fig. 3) is falling. Some Moslem countries, Algeria and Saudi Arabia, have a birth rate 
that proceeds the level that their economy (measured by GNP pr. capita) entitle to, showing 
that the economy has developed faster than the family structure. 
 
In the following the MENA-countries in the Middle East and North Africa will also be 
referred to as Islamic or Moslem countries because of the dominant religion in these 
countries. 
 
Within the last few years there has been observed a development in some of these Islamic 
counties, indicating that the former very high birth rates now are rapidly decreasing. This is 
for example happening in countries like Tunisia, Turkey, Qatar, The Arab Emirates and 
Iran. 
A remarkable example is seen in Iran. In this country there has been a period, where birth 
rates and total fertility rates have been extremely high but during the last two decades the 
birth rate and the total fertility rate has been violently falling. These fluctuations are the 
Saudi 
Arabia
United Arab 
Emirates Iran 
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result of the political, religious and economic development in the country during the last 40 
years. 
 
The first family planning policy was introduced in 1966 under Shah Reza Pahlavi, who 
wanted to accelerate the economic growth in Iran, looking at family planning as a human 
right (Abbassi-Shavazi 2002; Larsen 2001). These initiatives were reversed in 1979 in the 
10-year long Islamic revolution. It led to an enormous population growth for the following 
years. The former family planning programmes were then reintroduced in 1989. 
 
The Iranian demographer Mohammad Jalal Abbassi-Shavazi of the University of Tehran 
and colleagues have in several works described the demographic development throughout 
the last half century in Iran and have made their studies accessible on the Internet. 
 
Abassi-Shavazi and the other authors are showing an increase in birth rates and total fertility 
rate in Iran in the first short period after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The political efforts 
in this first period was to establish a high birth rate for reasons of an active foreign policy 
because of the need of the “20 Million Army” (Larsen 2001) for the war against Iraq. 
 
However, the extremely high birth rate between 1976 and 1986 with an annual population 
growth rate of 3.9 % (Mehryar et al. 2001) did not solve the short-sighted need for military 
personnel – as it takes about 20 years to produce a soldier. 
 
The big birth cohorts created instead vast economic problems with their need for education 
and economic support. And after the end of education there is a need for employment in 
industry etc. But here another big problem like in the other MENA-countries occurred: The 
lack of natural resources etc. to form the background for the needed production. 
 
In 1989 the Iranian government revised the family planning programme. Women were now 
encouraged to wait 3 – 4 years between pregnancies, and to avoid pregnancies when 
younger than 18 or older than 35. Postponing of marriage was also one of the means to 
reach the objectives in the programme. The rise of education and a higher prosperity level 
created a demand for family planning. Information on this item was broadcasted. The 
money for the educational programmes was funded with savings caused by fewer maternity 
leaves. Also religious leaders were involved in the campaign for smaller families issuing 
fatwas (religious edicts) that encourage the use of all types of contraceptives including as 
the first among Muslim countries permanent male and female sterilization. Iran is also the 
first country in the world that requires that both men and women take a class on 
contraception before receiving a marriage licence. (Larsen 2001) 
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15.000 health houses were established after 1990 providing 80 % of the Iranian population 
with family planning and health services. The government (M. Khatami) covered up till 80 
% of the family planning costs (Larsen 2001). The use of contraceptives increased both in 
rural and in urban areas. The percentage of the women in rural areas (57%) using modern 
methods of contraception in 1997 was higher than in urban areas (46%) (Abbasi-Shavazi 
2001)  
 
The effect of the changes in birth rates had a significant effect on the age distribution of the 
population of Iran during the following years. 
 
The age distribution of the Iranian population in 1976 and 1986 (Abbasi-Shavazi 2002) 
clearly shows the dominant group of persons younger than 20 compared with the 
economically productive age groups.  
 
In the 1986 census the Iranian population younger than 15 were 45.5 % of the total 
population (Statistical Yearbook of Iran), people older than 64 were only 3 %. In the 1996 
census these figures had changed to 39.5 % for persons younger than 15, 4.3 % for persons 
older than 64 years and 57.2 % for persons from 15 to 64 years of age. The corresponding 
numbers for Denmark in 2001 are 18 % (< 15), 14.9 % (>64) and 66.7 % (15-64).  
 
In 1996 this gives dependency ratios for Iran of 0.69 for the young population and 0.08 for 
the old population. The corresponding figures for Denmark 2001 are 0.27 for young and 
0.23 for old population. 
 
In the years following 1989 the total fertility rate in Iran fell from 7 till about 2 (fig.8). 
(Abbasi-Shavazi 2002).  An extrapolation for the age distribution of the Iranian population 
was made by U.S. Census Bureau and is showing the influence of the 10 years of high 
fertility on the Iranian population in the coming decades. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
Age-distribution in Iran 1986.  49 million inhabitants acc. to Statistical 
Center of Iran. 
 
Figure 5 
 
Age-distribution in Iran 2000. 66 million inhabitants.  
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Figure 6 
  
Age-distribution in Iran 2025. 85 million inhabitants.  
 
Figure 7 
 
 
Age-distribution in Iran 2050. 91 million inhabitants.   
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Figure 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total Fertility Rate (TFR) development in Iran 1972-2001. (Census by Statistical 
Centre of Iran, IDHS (Iranian Demographic and Health Service). (Abbasi-Shavazi 
2002)  
 
With figures for 2003 and 2004 as low as 1.99 and 1.93 according to www.indexmundi.com 
Iran is since 2003 below replacement-fertility. 
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Figure 9 
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Age specific fertility rates in Iran 1986, 1993, 2001 and 2020 (prognosis), 
Denmark 2001 and women in Denmark of Iranian origin 2001.  
(Danmarks Statistik/US Census Bureau. See table 2.). 
 
The age specific fertility-rates of the Iranian population have over a period of 16 years fallen 
in all cohorts and are now similar to the situation in Europe both in ethnic Danish 
population and for women of Iranian origin. 
 
The TFR in Iran is now below replacement fertility. Figures from the US Census Bureau 
shows that the fertility has been reduced in all cohorts with no special preference of age, 
region (urban/rural), ethnicity etc. (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000, 2001, 2002) The structure of the 
age specific fertility rates for Iran is very similar to the ones in Europe (Denmark for 
example) and the group of women of Iranian origin who live in Denmark.  
 
Although the total fertility rate is now (2004) 1.93 and below 2.00 (replacement fertility) 
(www.indexmundi.com), this does not have the effect that number of inhabitant in Iran is 
falling. A vast number of persons are now entering the reproductive groups and will in the 
coming decades probably give birth to an almost similar number of children as they are 
themselves. This means, that the population growth will continue within the coming 40-50 
years and in this period nearly double the Iranian population. The life expectancy is also 
growing. In 1980 Iranian women looked forward to 61 years, Iranian men to 59 years. In 
1998 women could expect 72 years and men 70 years. In the passed 18 years women added 
11 and men 9 years to their life-expectancy. In Denmark women added 1 year (77 to 78) and 
men added 2 years (71 to 73) in the same period. (World Bank Data Sheet) 
 
The development in Iran in the last 20 years can roughly be compared with the situation in 
Japan at the end of the Second World War, where the industrialization and economic growth 
created a vast demand for female workforce and gave background for a new law of abortion.  
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Figure 10 
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(1881-2003: Statistical Center of Iran/ 2004-2050: Prognosis from US Census Bureau).  
 
Earlier US-prognosis for Iran 2050 has been as high as 125 million inhabitants. 
 
However, there are differences. The TFR in Japan in 1945 was far below the TFR-level for 
Iran in the period before 1980. But first of all the development in Japan showed, that even 
though Japan had a violent fall in fertility, there came a period of more than 50 years where 
the Japanese population still was growing. The maximum has still not been reached, but is 
expected within the next decade. And in these 60 years the Japanese population has grown 
from 84 million till 126 million inhabitants. The crude birth rates in Japan fell strongly over 
a very short period. The number of newborns got significant smaller than the number of 
persons in the parent cohorts. In spite of this very strong effect on the number of children pr. 
family, we will have to reach at least the year 2005-2010 according to Japanese studies, 
before the Japanese population reaches its maximum number of inhabitants and starts to 
descend.  
 
Many of the countries in Europe have had birth control and falling fertility for at least one 
hundred years, and only a few of them have experienced a direct fall in number of 
inhabitants. 
 
It must here be mentioned, that changes in life expectancy also play a role. In Japan (both 
men and women) experienced an increase in life expectancy from 57 years (in 1948) to 80 
years (in 2001). Fewer people are born, but those who are born, live longer - and big cohorts 
who were born before the big fertility drop are having effect on the total number of births 
when they enter their years of parenthood two decades later. 
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Similarly there is also a considerable potential in some of the MENA-countries on behalf of 
life expectancy.  
 
Life expectancy in the MENA-countries is varying but normally considerably lower than in 
Europe. The infant mortality is still high. Even if the birth rates in the MENA-countries 
should fall violently throughout the next decade or two until European level, there is good 
reason to expect a doubling of the number of inhabitants in the countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa because of the expected extension of life expectancy and the fall in infant 
mortality still to come. 
 
For the MENA-countries this means they will have to secure resources for another 400 
million persons in an area with strongly limited natural resources. The amount of 
precipitation (rain) is insufficient to give a good supply of water to both population and 
agriculture. Good farmland is not at hand in needed amount for future self-sufficiency.  
 
Mineral resources in the MENA-countries are few. One possibility for economic 
development can be seen in targeting investments on production, while there still is an 
income from the oil production.  
 
With increasing demands for oil to industrial production also in China and India these 
resources will probably be empty within half a century. 
 
Both the MENA-countries and the Industrialized Countries in Europe and America will 
have to face vast problems in the near future.  
 
The population in the Islamic countries is foreseen to continue to grow for another 50 years 
at least. Resources here are not sufficient and there are limits to the economic sustainability 
of production and welfare systems in the European countries to solve the problems when 
receiving further immigration.  
 
These complex problems must seriously and with high priority be taken on the demographic 
and political agendas in all the involved countries. Solutions must be found while they are 
still possible.  
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Appendix – tables 
 
Table 1.  Table 1 is containing data used in fig.1 (crude birth and death rates from 1980 and 
1998), fig. 2 (Crude Birth Rate vs. GNP pr. Capita) and fig. 3 (TFR vs. GNP pr. Capita).  
 
 Crude birth and death rates (0/00) Total Fertility Rates 
Infant 
Mortality 
Prod./Welfare 
GNP/Cap. 
 Birth Death Birth Death TFR TFR Rate  
Country 1980 1980 1998 1998 1980 1998 1998 1998 
Algeria 42 12 26 6 6.7 3.5 35 4595 
Egypt 39 13 24 7 5.1 3.2 49 3146 
Libya 46 12 29 4 7.3 3.7 23 -- 
Morocco 38 12 25 7 5.4 3.0 49 3188 
Somalia 52 22 52 18 7.3 7.2 121 -- 
Tunisia 35 9 18 6 5.2 2.2 28 5169 
Israel 24 7 22 6 3.2 2.7 6 16861 
UAE  30 5 17 3 5.4 3.4 8 18871 
Saudi Arabia 43 9 34 4 7.3 5.7 20 10498 
Jordan -- -- 31 4 6.8 4.1 27 2615 
Libanon 30 9 21 6 4.0 2.4 27 4144 
Syria 46 9 29 5 7.4 3.9 28 2702 
Turkey 32 10 21 6 4.3 2.4 38 6594 
Iraq 41 9 32 10 6.4 4.6 103 -- 
Iran 44 11 22 5 6.7 2.7 26 5121 
Yemen 53 19 40 12 7.9 6.3 82 658 
Qatar 29 7 14 3 5.6 2.7 18 -- 
Pakistan 47 15 35 8 7.0 4.9 91 1652 
Afghanistan 50 23 47 20 7.0 6.8 149 -- 
Bangladesh 44 18 28 10 6.1 3.1 73 1407 
Indonesia 34 12 23 8 4.3 2.7 43 2407 
Denmark 11 11 13 11 1.5 1.8 5 23855 
Norway 12 10 13 10 1.7 1.8 4 26196 
Sweden 12 11 10 11 1.7 1.5 4 19848 
UK 13 12 12 11 1.9 1.7 6 20314 
Germany 11 12 10 10 1.4 1.4 5 22026 
Holland 13 8 12 9 1.8 1.6 5 22325 
Belgium 13 12 11 10 1.7 1.6 6 23622 
Finland 13 9 11 10 1.6 1.8 4 20641 
France 15 10 13 9 1.9 1.8 5 21214 
Italy 11 10 9 10 1.6 1.2 5 20365 
Schwitzerland 12 9 11 9 1.5 1.5 4 26876 
Austria 12 12 10 10 1.6 1.3 5 23145 
Portugal 16 10 12 11 2.2 1.5 8 14569 
Spain 15 8 9 9 2.2 1.2 5 15960 
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Table 2. Data used in fig. 9. Age specific fertility rates in Iran 1986, 1993, 2001 and 2020 (prognosis), Denmark 2001 
and women in Denmark of Iranian origin 2001. (Danmarks Statistik/US Census Bureau). 
 
Age specific Fertility Rates  Age of mothers 
 
 
Population group: TFR -19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 
Danes in Denmark 2001 1.7 6.7 49 127.3 108.9 39.8 5.5 0.1 
Iranians in Denmark 2001 2.4 15.8 122.6 126.4 123.7 71.3 15.2 2 
Iran 1986 7.2 130 302 322 287 224 126 39 
Iran 1993 3.8 69 169 170 141 116 70 25 
Iran 2001 2.1 26 89 123 99 56 28 9 
Iran 2020 Progn.: 1.71 10.4 63.6 118.1 96.1 38.4 13.3 2.2 
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